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THE U.S. PUSH FOR WORLDWIDE PATENT
PROTECTION FOR DRUGS MEETS THE AIDS CRISIS IN
THAILAND: A DEVASTATING COLLISION
Rosemary Sweeneyt
Abstract: In response to pressure from the United States, Thailand amended its
Patent Act in 1992 and 1999 to provide patent protection for drugs and to limit its control
on the pricing, importation, and compulsory licensing of patented drugs. These
amendments and, perhaps even more importantly, the threat of U.S. trade sanctions, will
probably ensure continued high prices and thus restricted access to new, patented
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") drugs in Thailand. These drugs have
dramatically changed the length and quality of life of patients infected with Human
Immunodeficieny Virus ("HIV") in developed countries. About one million Thais are
infected with HIV, but few have the resources to pay for these drugs. The U.S. pressure
on Thailand to provide strong patent protection for drugs has undermined Thailand's
ability to combat its AIDS epidemic. The United States should allow Thailand to
manufacture less-expensive generic copies of patented AIDS drugs without imposing
trade sanctions for this annulment of the intellectual property rights of drug companies.
If the United States and Western Europe could prevent the import of these generic copies
of AIDS drugs, which would entail only the enforcement of existing laws, it could protect
the primary markets that the pharmaceutical companies were relying on when the new
AIDS drugs were developed. Thus, the price of AIDS drugs in Thailand could be
lowered, making them accessible to more HIV-infected Thais, without destroying the
economic incentives of drug companies to develop new AIDS drugs.
I. INTRODUCTION
As Thailand struggles with an Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome ("AIDS") epidemic,' U.S. economic pressure has resulted in
amendments to Thailand's Patent Act that provide for strict patent protection
for drugs.2 These amendments and, perhaps more importantly, the threat of
t The author would like to thank Professors Toshiko Takenaka and Mike Townsend of the
University of Washington for comments, discussions, ideas, and encouragement; Chayatawatch Atibaedya
of Anek & Brischon Co. Ltd. in Bangkok for his assistance in understanding the meaning and substance of
the amendments to the Thai Patent Act; Say Sujintaya of Tilleke & Gibbins for sending an English
translation of the 1998 amended version of the Thai Patent Act; Orakanoke Phanraksa, a Thai LL.M.
student at the University of Washington, for her help with understanding Thailand and its laws; Tom Moran
of Cooley Godward for his comments on the viewpoint of the drug industry with respect to protection of
intellectual property; and Mark Ahn of Bristol-Myers Squibb for his insights into the role of drugs in
fighting the AIDS crisis.
1 Satya Sivaraman, Innovative Fronts in the Fight Against AIDS for Thailand's People, EARTH
TIMES NEWS SERVICE (visited Sept. 10, 1999) <http://www.earthtimes.org/oct/healthinnovativefrontsinthe
fightoct23_98.htm>; Ron Moreau, Thailand Plays by the Rules, NEWSWEEK, July 5, 1999, at 23.
2 Pra rad cha ban yat sit ti bat. Por Sor 2522 [Thailand Patent Act B.E. 2522] (1979) as amended by
Thailand Patent Act (No. 2) B.E. 2535 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Act], and by Thailand Patent Act (No. 3)
B.E. 2542 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 Act]) (1992 Act and 1999 Act on file with author); see infra Parts II,
III.
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U.S. trade sanctions, will ensure continued high prices for patented drugs.
Effective, but expensive, patented drugs have dramatically changed the
length and quality of life of patients infected with Human Immune
Deficiency Virus ("HIV"), the virus that causes AIDS, in developed
countries during the past four years.3 Most HIV-infected Thais are unable to
benefit from these drugs because of their expense.4 Although Thailand has
not produced less-expensive generic versions of these drugs, it could
arguably do so legally under its domestic laws and a recent international
agreement. The reasons for Thailand's failure to do this may be complex,
but fear of U.S. economic sanctions is probably a major consideration. 6
AIDS emerged in Thailand in the mid-1980s and spread rapidly. In
1984, the first case of AIDS was reported in Thailand,-and by the early
1990s an AIDS epidemic had taken hold. Currently, an estimated one
million people in Thailand are infected with HIV.9 AIDS is a crisis in
Thailand; three percent of the population is currently infected,' ° and AIDS is
now the leading cause of death." Several hundred children have already
been orphaned by this epidemic, and this number is expected to increase.
The situation is particularly severe in the northern and northeastern parts of
the country, where more than half of Thailand's HIV-infected citizens live.'
2
Protease inhibitors' 3 are new AIDS drugs that came into widespread
use in 1996 in the United States' 4 as part of a triple drug therapy that
3 Graeme J. Moyle & Brian G. Gazzard, A Risk-Benefit Assessment ofHIV Protease Inhibitors, 20
DRUG SAFETY 299, 300, 304 (1999); Russ Bynum, Drop in AIDS Deaths Tapers; Drug Gains May Have
Hit Limits, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 31, 1999, at A3.
4 Mukdawan Sakboon, AIDS Groups Seek WHO Monitoring Assistance, NATION (Bangkok), Aug.
17, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Group File; Shawn W. Crispin, New World Disorder: Strains in the
Global Trading Regime Are Set to Resurface at This Week's UNCTAD Summit in Bangkok, Where a
Controversy Has Been Brewing over Treatments for a Major Developing World Killer: AIDS, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Feb. 17, 2000, available in 2000 WL-FEER 8518019.
5 Another Appeal to the WTO-Doctors: Give Nations Access to Drugs, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1,
1999, at A3 [hereinafter Another Appeal]; Aphaluck Bhatiasevi & Woranuj Maneerungsee, HIVIAIDS:
Compulsory ddl Licensing Seen Unlikely; Ministries Prefer to Negotiate Drug Prices, BANGKOK POST,
Feb. 2, 2000, available in WL 4681140.
6 Sivaraman, supra note 1.
7 Id.
s Id.
9 See Crispin, supra note 4.
1o Thailand; Thai Army Winning AIDS Battle, FAR E. ECON. REV. (May 30, 1998)
<http://www.best.com/-utopia/aidsth.htm> [hereinafter Thai Army].
11 Moreau, supra note 1.
12 Sivaraman, supra note 1.
13 Protease inhibitors inhibit the activity of an HIV-encoded protein that is essential for the
production of infectious virions. Christopher D. Holtzer & Michelle Roland, The Use of Combination
Antiretroviral Therapy in HIV-Infected Patients, 33 ANN. PHARMACOTHER. 198, 200 (1999).
"4 Id. at 205.
VOL. 9 No. 2
THAILAND'S AIDS CRISIS
includes two different nucleoside analogs 15 and a single protease inhibitor., 6
This is now the standard of care in developed countries 17 and has
significantly prolonged life and delayed the progression to AIDS symptoms
in HIV-infected patients in these countries.' Protease inhibitors came into
widespread use in the United States in 1996.19 AIDS deaths in the United
States dropped twenty-three percent between 1995 and 1996,20 another forty-
two percent between 1996 and 1997, 2 1 and a further twenty percent between
1997 and 1998.22 Unfortunately, these drugs also have unpleasant side
effects,23 require adherence to a strict schedule of administration,24 and cost
25$12,000 per year. In Thailand, citizens and nongovernmental
organizations have appealed to the government to make AIDS drugs more
affordable, 26 but only a very small percentage of HIV-infected Thais receive
27these drugs. U.S. pressure on Thailand to protect drug patents has made it
difficult for most HIV-infected Thais to obtain access to AIDS drugs. A
15 Nucleoside analogs indirectly interfere with the activity of the HIV RNA-Dependent DNA
polymerase by terminating further insertion of nucleotides into an elongating chain of viral DNA. Id. at
199.
16 Moyle & Gazzard, supra note 3, at 299 (1999).
17 "Developed" is a term used to refer to wealthy countries such as the United States, Japan, or a
Western European country. A. P. THIRLWALL, GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 20-28 (2d ed. 1977). It is not
suggested that this is the only definition of "developed." See generally TOWARDS A RE-DEFINiTiON OF
DEVELOPMENT (Alain Birou et al. eds., 1977).
18 Moyle & Gazzard, supra note 3, at 300, 304 (1999); Bynum, supra note 3. However, triple drug
therapy does not work for all patients, and its long-term effects are unknown. Holtzer & Roland, supra
note 13, at 199, 207.
19 Holtzer & Roland, supra note 13, at 205.
20 Id.
21 Bynum, supra note 3.
22 id.
23 These side effects include nausea, vomiting, and redistribution of body fat from the extremities to
the body trunk. Moyle & Gazzard, supra note 3, at 308-11.
24 Patients may be taking up to 40 pills per day, taking medication every two to three hours over a
span of 16 hours. Some doses must be taken with food and some on an empty stomach. Holtzer & Roland,
supra note 13, at 198, 206-07.
25 New York Times Service, Drugs for AIDS Victims, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Neuilly-sur-Seine,
France), Aug. 24, 1999, at 6 [hereinafter Drugs for AIDS Victims]. This is about five times the predicted
average per capita gross domestic product in Thailand in 1999, which is $2,258. Pakdee Pothisiri et al.,
Funding Priorities for HIV/AIDS Crisis in Thailand (Paper presented at the 12th World AIDS Conference,
Geneva, Switzerland, June 1998) tbl. 1, available in AIDS Economics (visited Sept. 9, 1999)
<http://www.worldbank.org/aids-econ/thaifund.htm>.
26 Anjira Assavanonda, NGOs Rally Against Patent Law Changes: Call on US to Stop Pressuring
Thailand, BANGKOK POST (Sept. 5, 1998) <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/bangkokpost.html>; Group
Seeks Legislation Making Drugs Affordable to Those in Need, NATION (Bangkok), Sept. 4, 1998, at A3
[hereinafter Group Seeks Legislation]; Frank Ching, Drug Patents vs. Human Rights, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Feb. 17, 2000, available in 2000 WL-FEER 8518035; Aphaluck Bhatiasevi, Groups Seek Cheaper Drugs:
Patients Want More Pills Made Available, BANGKOK POST, Mar. 21, 2000, available in 2000 WL
17644223 [hereinafter Groups Seek Cheaper Drugs]; Crispin, supra note 4.
27 A study of 2,000 HIV-infected patients at Bamrasnaradul Hospital indicated that one percent of
these patients were receiving triple drug therapy. Sakboon, supra note 4. See also Crispin supra note 4.
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patent confers the right to exclusively market the patented product for a
limited time.28 Since a patentee has a temporary monopoly, the patentee
normally charges a higher price than it could in a competitive market. This
allows the patentee to recover research and development costs. Therefore,
products protected by patent are often more expensive than those that are
not. In the pharmaceutical industry, where the cost of research and
development is especially high,29 the difference in price between patented
drugs and generic copies can be large. 30 The price of a patented drug can
usually be substantially reduced by the production of generic copies because
production costs are often far lower than the prices set by the patentee.
31
This Comment discusses the U.S. actions that have contributed to
Thailand's failure to make AIDS drugs available to its HIV-infected citizens
at affordable prices. Part II examines the current law governing the
protection of drugs as intellectual property in Thailand. Part III discusses
the U.S. actions that precipitated the amendments to Thailand's Patent Act.
Part IV argues that by enforcing existing U.S. laws against importing
patented drugs, the United States could allow developing countries such as
Thailand to make less-expensive generic copies of patented AIDS drugs
without threatening the lucrative U.S. market for these drugs. This solution
would make less-expensive drugs available in Thailand without destroying
the incentives for pharmaceutical companies to develop new AIDS drugs.
II. LAWS GOVERNING PATENT PROTECTION FOR DRUGS IN THAILAND
Patent protection for drugs in Thailand is governed by Thailand's
Patent Act 32 and its obligations under the Agreement for Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs"), which came into effect in
28 FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 6, 9 (Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Study No. 15, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(GPO, 1958)), at 6.29 Kim Roller, What Will Drive Pharmacy Sales into the New Millennium?, DRUG STORE NEWS, Jan.
11, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Group File; Kevin W. McCabe, The January 1999 Review of Article
27 of the TRIPs Agreement: Diverging Views of Developed and Developing Countries Toward the
Patentability ofBiotechnology, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 49 (1998).
30 See Sarah Boseley, Trade Terrorism: US Attempts to Stop Developing Countries Producing Cheap
AIDS Drugs Have Become a Political Time Bomb, GUARDIAN, Aug. 11, 1999, available in LEXIS, News
Group File; James Love, Prepared Testimony Before the House Committee on Government Reform,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Human Resources, and Drug Policy: Consumer Project on Technology
(July 22, 1999), reprinted in FED. NEWS SERVICE, available in LEXIS, News Group File.
31 id.
32 1999 Act, supra note 2.
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1995.33 In 1992 and 1999, Thailand amended its Patent Act in response to
U.S. economic pressure.34 Under Thailand's previous Patent Act, which was
passed in 1979, drugs did not receive patent protection.35 The 1992
amendments provided patent protection for drugs for the first time in
Thailand 36 but provided liberal opportunities for compulsory licensing37 and
parallel importing,38 thereby softening the impact of patent protection on
drug prices. However, the 1999 amendments significantly narrowed
opportunities for compulsory licensing39 and virtually eliminated parallel
importing.40 TRIPs, on the other hand, arguably leaves the decision on
parallel importing to the discretion of each signatory country41 and provides
42for compulsory licensing in specific sets of circumstances, which are
different from those that allow compulsory licensing under Thailand's
current Patent Act.43
A. The Nature and Limits of Patent Protection
Under many legal regimes worldwide, new inventions with practical
utility are protected with patents, which give the inventor the right to
exclude unauthorized persons from commercially using the patented product
for a limited time. 44 Unauthorized copiers of the patented product can be
33 World Trade Org., An Overview of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) 1 (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.wto.org/wto/intellec/
intell2.htm>; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPs].
T 4 1992 Act, supra note 2; see infra notes 143-169 and accompanying text.
35 Thomas N. O'Neill, Intellectual Property Protection in Thailand: Asia's Young Tiger and
America's "Growing" Concern, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 603,609 (1990).
36 1992 Act, supra note 2, §§ 3, 55 bis.
37 A compulsory license is a grant by a patent-issuing government to a third party of the right to
make, use, or sell a patented product without the patent holder's consent. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL.,
PATENT LAW 1235 (1998).
38 Parallel importing is the practice of buying a patented product in one country and reselling it in a
second country. If the price of a drug is less in the first country than it is in the second, the parallel
importer will sell the product at a lower price than the patentee in the second country. Patented drugs are
sometimes sold at different prices in different countries by patentees and are always sold at lower prices by
copiers in countries with no patent protection for drugs. Blood and Gore: Office of the US Trade
Representative Goes Too Far in Promoting Interests of US Drug Companies Abroad, NATION, July 19,
1999, at 16 [hereinafter Blood and Gore].
3' That is, Sections 46 bis and 55 bis (2) were eliminated in the 1999 Act. Compare 1992 Act, supra
note 2, with 1999 Act, supra note 2.
40 1999 Act, supra note 2, § 36(7).
41 See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
42 TRIPs, supra note 33, art. 31.
43 1999 Act, supra note 2, pt. V.
44 MACHLUP, supra note 28, at 6, 9.
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stopped by an infringement suit.45 This system offers economic incentives
to inventors to produce new products46 because their monopoly allows them
to charge a premium price for their product, recoup their investment in
research and development, and earn a profit. Without this protection,
copiers can undersell the inventor because the copiers have no need to
recoup research and development costs. With current levels of patent
protection for drugs worldwide, it is estimated that pharmaceutical
companies lose between one and five billion dollars per year from the
unauthorized copying of patented drugs. 7
A patentee's rights can be limited in some situations. In the United
States, judges have the power to deprive a patentee of her monopoly should
enforcement of a patent endanger public health.4 8 Such a judicial or
governmental annulment of patent rights is called a compulsory license.49 If
a country issues a compulsory license for a particular patented drug, or if it
provides no patent protection for drugs, there is nothing that prevents
citizens of that country from producing that drug, typically at a much lower
price.
50
The practice of parallel importing can also erode a patentee's rights.
Parallel importing occurs when a distributor buys a product in a country
where it is sold at a low price, with or without patent protection, and resells
it without authorization in a second country in direct competition with the
patentee or authorized distributor.5 1 Parallel importers normally sell the
product for less than the patentee. 2  Parallel importing is generally
45 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1984).
46 MACHLUP, supra note 28, at 33.
47 Letter from Shannon S.S. Herzfeld, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association, to Ms. Sybia
Harrison, Special Assistant to the Section 301 Committee, United States Trade Representative (Feb. 16,
1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter to Ms. Harrison]; George K. Foster, Opposing Forces in a
Revolution in International Patent Protection: The US. and India in the Uruguay Round and Its Aftermath,
3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 283, 297-98 (1998). For example, two pharmaceutical companies, Pfizer
International Corporation and SmithKline Beecham, estimated losses in 1984 of $4.2 and $4.9 million,
respectively. O'Neill, supra note 35, at 608 (1990).
48 KIMBERLY PACE MOORE ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 488 (1999); DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.04[2] (1999).
49 ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 1235.
50 Love, supra note 20.
51 Claude E. Barfield & Mark A Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical Industry:
Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 185, 185 (1999).
52 David Perkins et al., Exhaustion ofIntellectual Property Rights, 574 PLL/PAT. 41,46 (1999).
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forbidden in developed countries5 3 and has been the subject of intense
international debate.
54
B. The 1992 and 1999 Amendments to Thailand's Patent Act
1. Drugs Are Patentable
In 1992, Thailand amended its Patent Act to provide patent protection
for pharmaceuticals for the first time. 55 Patent protection became available
for any invention.56 According to the 1992 Patent Act, "any innovation or
invention which creates a new product or process, or any improvement of a
known product or process" is patentable. 57 Part VII of the Patent Act, which
deals exclusively with drug patents, confirms that this broad definition
includes drugs.58
2. Compulsory Licensing
In addition to providing patent protection for drugs, the 1992
amendments created a Pharmaceutical Patents Board ("Patents Board"),
which had the power to initiate proceedings that could lead to the
compulsory licensing of drugs.59 The Patents Board may have been created
to mitigate the domestic political consequences of the 1992 amendments,
which were unpopular. 60 The Patents Board, which consisted of government
officials and appointees, 61 supervised drug patent holders to ensure that
Thailand received patented drugs in adequate quantities and at reasonable
62prices. If patent holders did not comply, the Patents Board could initiate
proceedings that would culminate in a compulsory license.63 The Patents
Board also had the power to require drug companies to submit information
53 Harold C. Wegner, Parallel Imports of Patented Goods Killing the Technology Transfer Goose,
14-18, 23 (Presentation at the Fordham University School of Law, Sixth Annual Conference on
International Intellectual Property Law & Policy, Apr. 16-17, 1998) (on file with author).
54 See generally id.
55 1992 Act, supra note 2, §§ 3, 55 bis.
56 Id.§3.
57 Id.
5 Id.§ 55.
5' Id. §§ 46 bis, 55 bis-septem.
60 Stefan Kirchanski, Protection of U.S. Patent Rights in Developing Countries: U.S. Efforts to
Enforce Pharmaceutical Patents in Thailand, 16 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 569, 592 (1994).
61 1992 Act, supra note 2, § 55 ter.
62 Id. §§ 55 bis, 55 ter, 55 quarter.
63 Id. §§ 55 quinque, 46 bis.
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concerning production costs and pricing,64 information that drug companies
are loathe to divulge and that can be crucial in determining whether a drug is
reasonably priced. 65
The 1999 amendments narrowed the rights of the government to issue
compulsory licenses. 66 Under both the 1992 and 1999 amendments, when
"no product [is] produced under the patent for sale in any domestic market,
or there are some but they are sold at unreasonably high prices or do not
meet the public demand without any legitimate reason," then a compulsory
license can be issued for that product.67 Under the 1992 Act, such a
compulsory license could be issued either upon an uninvited application of a
prospective licensee or by an application in response to an announcement of
the Director-General of the Department of Intellectual Property inviting
applications for a compulsory license.68 The 1999 amendments eliminated
the Director-General's power to issue a public invitation for compulsory
license applications.69 The Patents Board, which had the power to require
the disclosure of the production costs of drugs,7 ° was also eliminated by the
1999 amendments. 7' Without the Patents Board, it could be difficult to
determine whether a drug's price is unreasonable, a determination that
justifies the issuance of a compulsory license.72  These changes greatly
decrease the likelihood that compulsory licenses will be issued in Thailand
for patented drugs.
6 Id. § 55 bis. Interestingly, by 1993 the Thai government was already considering adjusting the
role of the Pharmaceutical Patents Board and assigning the Committee on Price Fixing and Anti-Monopoly
to control drug prices instead. British Broadcasting Corporation, USA-Protection for Foreign Patented
Medicine Planned, Mar. 31, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Asia/Pacific Rim Stories.
65 Glaxo-Wellcome, a large drug company, refused to disclose the cost of manufacturing AZT. See
Alex Duvall Smith, Focus AIDS: A Continent Left to Die; the AIDS Virus Will Kill 30 Million Africans in
the Next 20 Years. Are the Drug Companies Making the Situation Worse?, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 5, 1999, at
16.
66 These amendments became effective on September 27, 1999, and the new Patent Act is therefore
dated 1999. Intellectual Property Department, Tilleke & Gibbins R.O.P., Amendment of the Thai Patent
Act 1979 (As Amended 1992) (visited Jan. 29, 2000) <http://www.tillekeandgibbins.com/home.html>
[hereinafter Tilleke & Gibbins R.O.P.].
67 1992 Act, supra note 2, § 46(2); 1999 Act, supra note 2, § 46(2).
68 1992 Act, supra note 2, §§ 46, 46 bis.
69 That is, this aspect of the 1992 Act was eliminated by the 1999 Act. Compare id. with 1999 Act,
supra note 2.
70 See 1992 Act, supra note 2, § 55 bis.
71 That is, Section 55 bis (2) of the 1992 Act was eliminated in the 1999 Act. 1999 Act, supra note
2.
72 1999 Act, supra note 2, § 46.
VOL. 9 No. 2
THAILAND S AIDS CRISIS
3. Parallel Importing
The 1992 Patent Act is ambiguous on the subject of parallel
importing. Parallel importing is the practice of importing a product bought
in one country into a second country where the product is protected by
patent and often sold by the patentee at a much higher price.73 The 1992
Patent Act provides that the patentee has the exclusive right to "produce,
use, sell, possess for sale, offer for sale or import" the patented product. 74 It
is, however, ambiguous on the subject of exhaustion of these rights.
Exhaustion of intellectual property rights refers to the point at which a
patentee's rights end.75 The key issue is whether one who legally buys a
patented product remains under some limitation on what she can do with this
product. The 1992 Patent Act provides that "any act connected with
products acquired in good faith" is exempt from an assertion of infringement
by the patent holder.76 This language suggests that parallel importing might
be tolerated because less-expensive drugs bought in a country with or
without patent protection for drugs could arguably be acquired in good faith.
In contrast to the 1992 amendments, the 1999 amendments clearly
forbid the importation of generic copies of patented drugs made without the
patentee's consent.77 In 1999, the exemption of importers of "products
acquired in good faith"78 from infringement suits was narrowed. Currently,
the exception only applies if the original sale or manufacture of the imported
products was consented to by the patentee. 79  Therefore, importation of
generic copies, even from countries where generic production is legal
because drugs are not protected by patents, was forbidden by the 1999
amendments.
In making these two sets of amendments, Thailand has radically
changed its patent policies with respect to drugs. Before the amendments,
Thailand offered no patent protection for drugs,80 and it was therefore legal
to make and sell or to import any drug patented in another country without
compensating the owner of the foreign patent. Now a patent can be obtained
for a drug in Thailand. 81 Under current Thai law, it constitutes infringement
73 Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 51, at 185.
74 1992 Act, supra note 2, § 36(1).
7' ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 1284-86.
76 1992 Act, supra note 2, § 36(3).
77 1999 Act, supra note 2, § 36(7).
78 1992 Act, supra note 2, § 36(3).
79 1999 Act, supra note 2, § 36(7).
go Tilleke & Gibbins R.O.P., supra note 66.
81 1999 Act, supra note 2, § 3.
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to make or sell a drug patented in Thailand unless a license is obtained from
the patentee or the government issues a compulsory license.82 It is also
illegal to import inexpensive generic copies of a drug patented in Thailand if
the drug is made in another country without the patentee's consent.83 Thus,
the only legal avenue open to obtain a patented drug at inexpensive prices is
that of a compulsory license issued by the Thai government.
C. TRIPs: An International Standard for the Protection of Intellectual
Property
TRIPs 84 imposes minimum standards for the protection of intellectual
property on signatory states in exchange for most-favored-nation treatment
by all other signatory states with regard to the protection of intellectual
property, 85 as well as a vague assurance to developing countries that
technology will be transferred to them.8 6 In a sense, TRIPs serves as a
yardstick against which intellectual property laws are measured, since
signatory states must, if necessary, alter their domestic laws and practices to
make them consistent with TRIPs.87 Although TRIPs is a product of
multilateral negotiation, the inequities inherent in the different bargaining
positions of developed and developing countries is apparent in the TRIPs
agreement, which largely serves the interests of corporations from developed
countries.88 However, TRIPs does include some concessions to developing
countries.
8 9
82 See id. §§ 45-52.
83 Id. § 36(7).
8 The 1993 Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations produced TRIPs, and both Thailand
and the United States are signatory states. See Myles Getlan, TRIPs and the Future of Section 301: A
Comparative Study in Trade Dispute Resolution, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173, 199-201 (1995).
5 TRIPs, supra note 33, art. 4.
56 Id. art. 66(2).
87 Id. art. 1(1.
88 "[M]any public interest advocates generally believe the TRIPs agreement inappropriately favors
corporations." Africa Policy Information Center, Africa-at-Large AIDS Drugs Policy, AFRICA NEWS,
Sept. 7, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, News, Documents & Commentary; see also McCabe,
supra note 29, at 67 n. 1.
89 See TRIPs, supra note 33, arts. 6 (does not address the issue of exhaustion of intellectual property
rights), 27(2), (3) (allows signatory states to exclude some subject matter from patentability), 31(b)(provides for the issuance of compulsory licenses in some situations), 41(5) (places no obligation on
signatory states to put in place a judicial system specifically for the enforcement of intellectual property
rights), 65-67 (gives developing countries additional time to implement TRIPs and encourages developed
countries to transfer technology to developing countries).
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1. TRIPs Requires Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals
As a signatory of TRIPs, Thailand is required to provide patent
protection for inventions "in all fields of technology." 90 An exception to this
provision is that patents need not be granted for "diagnostic, therapeutic, and
surgical methods for the treatment of humans and animals."9' Although this
phrase could be construed to mean that drugs need not be protected by
patents, Article 70(8) of TRIPs requires member countries to set up a means
of collecting applications for pharmaceutical patents,92 suggesting that
pharmaceuticals are protected under TRIPs. The rights granted under the
patent must include the right to prevent third parties from making, using,
offering for sale, selling, or importing the product without the consent of the
patentee.93 As of 1992, Thailand's laws met this requirement.94
2. TRIPs Is Ambiguous on Parallel Importing
Parallel importing generated so much disagreement in the TRIPs
negotiations that this issue was specifically left unresolved in TRIPs. 95
Under Article 6 of TRIPs "nothing in this Agreement shall be used to
address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights." 96 On its
face, this provision seems to leave the decision of whether to permit parallel
importing to each individual country. If a country decides that the first sale
of a product anywhere in the world exhausts the rights of a patentee, then
parallel importing is allowed.97 If a country decides that it is, rather, the first
sale of the product within the country in which it is patented that exhausts
the patentee's rights, then parallel importing is not allowed.98 However,
there is debate about the meaning of this provision given the dual purposes
of TRIPs to promote unfettered world trade and to promote the protection of
intellectual property rights. 99  Furthermore, a patentee's exclusive right
under TRIPs "to prevent third parties not having his consent from the acts
90 Id. art. 27(1). Thailand must comply with TRIPs by either 2000, if it takes no special action, or by
2006, if it applies for and is granted least-developed member country status. Id. arts. 65-66.
9' Id. art. 27(3)(a).
92 See Foster, supra note 47, at 290 (citations omitted).
93 TRIPs, supra note 33, art. 28(l)(a).
94 1992 Act, supra note 2, §§ 1-23, 55 bis-septem.
95 Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 51, at 190; TRIPs, supra note 33, art. 6; see also supra note
38 for a definition of parallel importing.
96 TRIPs, supra note 33, art. 6.
97 See Wegner, supra r.ote 53, at 2-3.
98 Id,
99 Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 51, at 191-93.
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of: making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing"' 00 might be
construed as being in conflict with Article 6. However, a footnote to this
provision states that it is subject to the provisions of Article 6.01 Moreover,
even the European Union, whose members are highly developed countries,
practices a limited form of parallel importing. 0 2  On the other hand, the
effect of the laws of the United States and Japan is to prohibit parallel
importing. 1 0
3
3. TRIPs Allows Compulsory Licensing in National Emergencies
Under TRIPs, a country that grants a patent on a product may grant a
third party the right to produce this patented product without the patent
holder's consent in some situations.1°4 Such compulsory licensing can
reduce prices of drugs by as much as ninety-five percent. 105 Under TRIPs, if
"the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right
holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and ... such efforts
have not been successful within a reasonable period of time,"',0 6 and if "the
right holder [is] paid adequate remuneration, ' 1°7 a compulsory license can be
issued.108  This requirement may be waived in "the case of a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public
non-commercial use" as long as the right holder is informed as soon as
possible and remunerated. 10 9 Any compulsory license is limited to the
00 TRIPs, supra note 33, art. 28(l)(a).
olf Id. art. 28(l)(a) n.6.
102 The first sale of a product in any European Union member country exhausts the patentee's rights.
For example, if a patented drug is first sold in Spain, the patentee's rights within the European Union end
with this sale. The same drug can then be legally resold anywhere in the European Union by anyone who
purchased the drug in Spain. Since drugs are sold at far lower prices in Spain and Portugal than they are in
the rest of Europe due to government price controls, this rule allows all of Europe to benefit from these
price controls. Great Britain and the Netherlands take advantage of this situation to obtain cheaper drugs.
Karine Cunqueiro, Health Trade: Hostile AIDS Activists Target Gore, INTERPRESS SERVICE, July 18, 1999,
available in LEXIS, News Library. However, the sale of a patented product outside the European Union
does not exhaust the patentee's rights within the European Union. For example, if a drug is protect-d by
patent in France and a generic copy of this drug is bought in India, the buyer of the Indian generic copy
cannot resell it in France without the patentee's consent. However, if he does obtain the patentee's
permission and does sell the drug in France, any buyer can legally resell the drug anywhere in the European
Union without the patentee's consent. Wegner, supra note 53, at 12.
103 Wegner, supra note 53, at 4-1l, 17-24.
:04 TRIPs, supra note 33, art. 31.
05 Love, supra note 30.
06 TRIPs, supra note 33, art. 3 1(b).
0' Id. art. 3 1(h).
10' Id. art. 31 n.7.
'09 Id. art. 31(b).
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purpose for which it is authorized" ° and is non-exclusive and non-
assignable."' These conditions differ from the conditions under which a
compulsory license can be granted under Thailand's Patent Act, a
discrepancy that might be significant should Thailand try to impose
compulsory licenses on holders of drug patents.12
4. The Thai Patent Act Arguably Meets All TRIPs Requirements
Thailand's Patent Act arguably meets, and in some areas exceeds, the
minimum requirements called for by TRIPs with respect to patent protection
for drugs. Even as of 1992, it could be argued that Thailand's Patent Act
met all of these requirements. Like TRIPs, the 1992 Patent Act required
patent protection for drugs and was ambiguous on the subject of parallel
importing. 13 The provisions on compulsory licensing arguably conflict with
TRIPs. TRIPs provides for a specific set of conditions under which
compulsory licenses might be issued, 14 which are somewhat different from
the conditions under which compulsory licenses are granted under
Thailand's Patent Act." 5  However, in any given factual scenario, these
provisions might produce the same results. They can therefore be seen as
harmonious even though they are different. As of 1999, Thailand's Patent
Act gave more protection against parallel importing than did TRIPs. 1 6 It
also made it more difficult to obtain compulsory licenses for drugs than it
had been under the 1992 Patent Act. 1 7 Most of the requirements for the
issuance of compulsory licenses remained unchanged and slightly different
from the TRIPs requirements." 8
"0 Id. art. 31(c).
Id. art. 31(d),(e).
112 Although the suit was recently dropped, South Africa was sued by drug companies in its own
courts for passing a law that allows the compulsory licensing of drugs. Gumisai Mutume, Trade: U.S.
Drug Companies Ease Up on South Africa, INTERPRESS SERVICE, Sept. 12, 1999, available in LEXIS,
News Library. See also James Love, Al Gore's Drug Problem, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 9, 1999, at
corresfondence 7; Drugs for AIDS Victims, supra note 25; Cunquiero, supra note 102.
TRIPs, supra note 33, arts. 27(1), 70(8); 1992 Act, supra note 2, §§ 55 bis-septem, 36(3).
224 TRIPs, supra note 33, art. 31.
225 1992 Act, supra note 2, §§ 45-52.
26 Compare 1999 Act, supra note 2, § 36(7), with TRIPs, supra note 33, art. 6.
117 See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
128 Compare 1992 Act, supra note 2, §§ 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, with 1999 Act, supra note 2, §§ 46, 47, 47
bis, 48, 51, 52; TRIPs, supra note 33, art. 31.
MAY 2000
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
D. Thailand Could Legally Issue Compulsory Licenses for AIDS Drugs
Arguably, Thailand could issue compulsory licenses for AIDS drugs
without violating either TRIPs or the 1999 Patent Act, but it has not.1 19
TRIPs authorizes the issuance of compulsory licenses in national
emergencies, 20 and the AIDS crisis in Thailand is arguably a national
emergency. Thus, Thailand could issue compulsory licenses for AIDS drugs
without violating TRIPs. Under the 1999 Patent Act, Thailand can issue
compulsory licenses for products "sold at unreasonably high prices or...
not meet[ing] the public demand."' 2' AIDS drugs would arguably fit into
one or both of these categories. Therefore, issuance of compulsory licenses
for AIDS drugs would also be legal under Thailand's Patent Act. However,
Thailand has failed to issue such compulsory licenses. 12 2 The threat of U.S.
trade sanctions is the likely reason for this failure. 123
III. EVENTS PRECIPITATING THE AMENDMENTS TO THAILAND'S PATENT
ACT
In 1992 Thailand amended its Patent Act in response to economic
pressure, largely from the United States.' 24 Although the 1992 amendments
were compliant in some respects with U.S. wishes that Thailand provide
strong legal protection for patented drugs, 25 these amendments left Thailand
with significant legal leverage to control drug prices. 12 6 However, in the
wake of a devastating economic crisis in 1997, Thailand amended its Patent
Act again, virtually eliminating this control. These amendments likely
resulted from fear of losing access to the U.S. market, Thailand's biggest
export market. 27 The legal tools employed to effect these amendments were
1'9 Crispin, supra note 4; Achura Pongvutitham, Thailand Wins Praise for Protection of IP Rights,
NATION (Bangkok), Feb. 18, 2000.120 TRIPs, supra note 33, art. 3 1(b).
121 1999 Act, supra note 2, § 46(2).
122 Crispin, supra note 4; Pongvutitham, supra note 119.
:23 Crispin, supra note 4.
124 See infra notes 143-169 and accompanying text.
25 See 1992 act, supra note 2, §§ 3, 55 bis-septem.
126 Id. §§ 36(3), 55 bis-septem.
127 See Thai P.M. on U.S. Threats of Trade Sanctions, XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE
(Bangkok), Apr. 28, 1991, Item No. 0428052, available in LEXIS, News Library, Asia/Pacific Rim Stories
[hereinafter Thai P.M.).
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two U.S. laws, the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") 128 and
Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.'
29
A. Instruments of Unilateral Persuasion: The GSP and Section 301
Developing countries can realize substantial trade benefits if they
cooperate with the United States on intellectual property issues. Under the
GSP, the U.S. president has the discretion to grant duty-free treatment to
"any eligible article from a beneficiary developing country."' 30  Among
other things, the president considers whether the beneficiary developing
country "is providing adequate and effective means under its laws for
foreign nationals to secure, to exercise, and to enforce exclusive rights in
intellectual property."' 31 The effects of this law terminated on June 30,
1999, as specified by its sunset clause.'
32
Whereas the GSP offered incentives to developing countries to
promulgate and enforce intellectual property laws, Section 301 potentially
punishes countries that fail to comply with U.S. wishes. Section 301
provides for a threat of trade sanctions against any trade partner that fails to
provide "adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights"'
' 33
or denies "fair and equitable market access to United States persons who
rely upon intellectual property protection."' 34  The United States Trade
Representative ("USTR") must list such suspect countries within thirty days
of issuing its yearly National Trade Estimate Report and must subsequently
investigate these countries. 35  Investigation of a country can also be
precipitated at the request of an interested U.S. party, often a trade group
that claims its intellectual property rights have been violated in the country
in question. 36 Countries are classified as (1) "priority foreign countries,"
(for the most egregious violations), (2) "priority watch list countries" (for
lax protection of intellectual property), or (3) "watch list countries" (for
128 The GSP forms Subchapter V of the Trade Act of 1974. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-67 (1988).
129 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 301-09, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975) (amended by
Omnibus Trade and Competitivenesss Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (1988)) [hereinafter Section 301].
130 19 U.S.C. § 2461; see also 19 U.S.C. §§ 2462, 2463, 2467 (outlining how "beneficiary countries"
and "eligible articles" are defined and designated).
I~' Id. § 2463(c).
1a2 Id. § 2465.
133 Id. § 2242(a)(1)(A).
114 Id. § 2242(a)(1)(B).
"3 Id. § 2412(b)(2)(A).
136 Id. § 2242(b)(2)(B), (0(2)(A).
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minor violations). 137  The investigations are intended to lead to
negotiations, 138 but the USTR may increase import duties or impose other
restrictions on imports if a priority country does not alter its intellectual
property policies to meet the expectations of the United States. 39 Despite
the existence of a dispute resolution system under TRIPs, 140 the United
States has continued its unilateral activities under Section 301,14 1 even
though these actions may conflict with TRIPs and other international
agreements. 1
42
B. U.S. Pressure on Thailand to Change Its Laws Prior to 1992
Starting with the passage of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act in the United States in 1988,143 Thailand was subjected to continual U.S.
pressure to amend its patent laws to provide protection for drugs. On
January 19, 1989, the United States reduced Thailand's GSP benefits by
$165 million.44 The USTR included Thailand in the "priority watch list" in
the first National Trade Estimate Report of May 25, 1989,145 demanded
improved patent protection from Thailand for all types of inventions, and
threatened action if no further progress was made by November 1, 1989.146
In 1991, the USTR moved Thailand from the "priority watch list" to the
status of a "priority foreign country,"'14 7 a classification that reflects
egregious violations of U.S. intellectual property rights. Thailand was
already under investigation by the USTR for alleged violations of American
intellectual property rights after complaints were made by the International
Intellectual Property Alliance and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's
Association ("PhRMA"). 148 Instead of launching a new investigation, the
USTR decided to continue its ongoing investigation.149
... Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301 ": Its Requirements, Implementation, and
Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259, 267 (1990).
13' Id. at 263.
139 Kirchanski, supra note 60, at 587-88 (citations omitted).
140 TRIPs, supra note 33, pt. V.
'4n See, e.g., Achara Pongvutitham, U.S. Focuses on Thai Piracy Ahead of GSP Review (visited Oct.
12, 1999) <http://skali.com.my/technology/cmp/199903/24/cmpl9990324_09.html>.
141 See generally Getlan, supra note 84.
43 Bello & Holmer, supra note 137, at 259.
'4 O'Neill, supra note 35, at 616.
'45 Kirchanski, supra note 60, at 588 (citation omitted).
'4 Id. at 588-89 (citation omitted).
141 Id. at 590.
i4s Id. at 590 n.144.
14 Id. at 589.
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Because the United States was Thailand's largest export market,' 50
economic retaliation by the United States for failure to amend its intellectual
property laws was a primary concern for Thailand. Thai officials worried
about U.S. "retaliation which could result in... raising import tariffs by up
to 100 percent on some items."'151  Although the changes to Thailand's
intellectual property law were unpopular in Thailand, 152 government
officials announced in May of 1991 that they would take the steps necessary
to ease U.S. pressure on Thailand. 53 The 1992 Patent Act was passed on
February 27, 1992.154
C. Events Leading up to the 1999 Amendments
Even after Thailand passed the 1992 amendments to its Patent Act, the
patent protection offered for drugs in Thailand did not satisfy the United
States. 55  Within one week after the passage of the 1992 amendments,
Sandra Kristoff, deputy assistant to the USTR, suggested that Thailand could
eliminate the Patents Board and narrow the conditions under which it would
grant compulsory licenses. 156 These views were shared by USTR Carla Hill,
who called Thailand's policies unreasonable and harmful to U.S.
companies, 157 and PhRMA, the president of which commented that the
"amendments contain onerous and punitive provisions."' 58 By April 1993,
Thailand remained on the USTR's list of "priority foreign countries," and
the USTR had listed Thailand's twenty most active exports, from which Hill
would select items for prohibitive tariffs should the United States decide on
15o See Thai P.M., supra note 127.
15' See Kirchanski, supra note 60, at 591.
52 Opponents of reform argued that (1) protection of drugs by patent was objectionable on public
health policy grounds, (2) changing laws in response to U.S. browbeating betrays Thailand's national
honor, and (3) the United States lacks the moral imperative to force Thailand to abandon pirate production
since it pirated many goods from Western Europe in the nineteenth century. O'Neill, supra note 35, at 619-
22.
153 Thailand Takes Steps to Ease U.S. Pressure on Article 301 Issues, XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAS NEWS
SERVICE, May 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Asia/Pacific Rim Stories.
154 Kirchanski, supra note 60, at 592.
155 See infra notes 156-158 and accompanying text.
156 Thailand Calls for Review of Bilateral Economic Cooperation Treaty with America, XINHUA GEN.
OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Asia/Pacific Rim Stories.
157 Henrik Hansen, U.S.T.R. Defers Action Against Thailand, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Mar. 15,
1992, at 6.
158 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association Welcomes USTR Determination on Thai Patent Law,
U.S. Newswire, Mar. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library.
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harsher sanctions. 159 In September 1993, the USTR removed Thailand from
the list of "priority foreign countries" and placed it on the less serious
"priority watch list" because Thailand had made progress in curbing
widespread copyright violations,' 60 another area of conflict between the two
countries. Finally, in November 1994, following the passage of a new
copyright law in Thailand, the USTR removed Thailand from the "priority
watch list" and placed it on the "regular watch list."' 6 1
In 1997, Thailand suffered a severe economic crisis that placed it in a
weak position to resist U.S. attempts to dictate changes in its intellectual
property laws. Between 1996 and 1998, the value of the Thai baht fell by
almost one-half, and per capita income in Thailand fell by forty percent.
Thai government officials expressed hopes during this period that Thailand
could finally be removed from the USTR watch list so that more of its
exports could enjoy the benefits of the GSP.163 Ties to the global economy
in the form of International Monetary Fund support and access to the U.S.
export market also became crucial to Thailand's economic survival.' 64
Nongovernmental organizations and citizen groups in Thailand protested the
U.S. pressure and its likely consequences, that is, amendments to the Thai
Patent Act narrowing Thailand's legal rights to produce inexpensive
drugs.' 65 Nonetheless, the United States was successful in persuading
Thailand to amend its Patent Act again in October 1998.166 These
amendments eliminated the Pharmaceutical Patents Board 167  and
significantly narrowed the ability of Thais to produce or import generic
versions of patented drugs. 168  Even after this, Thailand remained on the
19 Qi Deliang, Roundup: Harsh US. Reaction Feared on Thai Trade, XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAS
NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Asia/Pacific Rim Stories [hereinafter
Harsh U.S. Reaction].
160 Information Access Company, US. Upgrades Thailand Trade Status, VIETNAM INVESTMENT
REV., Sept. 13, 1993, at 14.
161 Ken Barrett, Thailand Rewarded for Copyright Law, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Nov. 17, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Country & Region, Asia & Pacific Rim, News.
162 Pothisiri et al., supra note 25, tbl. 1.
'63 Thailand to Crack Down on IPR Violations, XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAS NEWS AGENCY (Bangkok),
Apr. 2, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Asia/Pacific Rim Stories; USTR Official Holds Talks on
Copyrights, NATION (Thailand), Aug. 17, 1998, at A2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Asia/Pacific
Rim Stories.
:64 Moreau, supra note 1.
65 Assavanonda, supra note 26.
'6 Moreau, supra note I; Smith, supra note 65; 1999 Act, supra note 2. The 1998 amendments
became effective on September 27, 1999, and the new Patent Act is therefore dated 1999. Tilleke &
Gibbins R.O.P., supra note 66.
167 Compare 1992 Act, supra note 2, §§ 55 bis-septem, with 1999 Act, supra note 2.
68 Compare 1992 Act, supra note 2, §§ 45-52, with 1999 Act, supra note 2, §§ 45-52.
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USTR's watch list because of allegedly inadequate protection of patents,
copyrights, and other intellectual property. 1
69
D. Thailand Has Put Economic Considerations Above Health Care for
AIDS Patients
Thailand has succumbed to U.S. pressure in order to help its economy,
which has resulted in high prices for AIDS drugs. 170  U.S. pressure has
resulted in amendments to the Thai Patent Act that have cut off the
possibility of parallel importing to obtain less-expensive, generic versions of
these drugs and narrowed the situations in which compulsory licenses can be
issued to produce generic versions of AIDS drugs locally.17' Even with
these strict laws, Thailand might still legally issue compulsory licenses for
AIDS drugs, though it has not. Despite recent indications that the United
States might not impose trade sanctions if Thailand were to issue
compulsory licenses for AIDS drugs, 172 Thai officials continue to be wary of
U.S. trade sanctions. 173 Thailand could ill afford U.S. trade sanctions in the
wake of its 1997 financial crisis.174
IV. THAILAND SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO MAKE AIDS DRUGS WITHOUT
FEAR OF U.S. RETRIBUTION
The likely reason that Thailand has not already made generic copies
of the drugs necessary for triple drug therapy is its fear of U.S. trade
169 Worldsources, Inc., Thailand Still on US Watchlist over IPR, NATION (Bangkok), May 25, 1999,
at B 1-2.
170 Sakboon, supra note 4.
171 See supra notes 60-79 and accompanying text.
172 In reply to a letter from the Network of People with HIV/AIDS in Thailand, USTR Joseph
Papovich said that the United States will not raise objections if the Thai government is determined to issue
compulsory licensing to address its health care crisis, provided it complies with TRIPs. Bhatiasevi &
Maneerungsee, supra note 5. Thai officials fear that the United States may interpret TRIPs differently than
Thailand does. Thailand Battles AIDS Medicine Monopoly, ASIAN ECON. NEWS, Feb. 28, 2000, available
in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus [hereinafter Thailand Battles]. U.S. President Bill Clinton appears also to
have shifted his perspective. In 1998 the United States opposed World Health Organization policies
supporting improved access to patented medicines in developing countries. However, Clinton recently
stated, "But when HIV and AIDS epidemics are involved, the United States will henceforward implement
its health-care and trade policies in a manner that ensures that people in the poorest countries won't have to
go without the medicine they so desperately need." Crispin, supra note 4.
173 Somsong Rukphao, head of the Thai Ministry of Health's Communicable Disease Centre, stated,
"We must consider the livelihood of our 62 million people, not just our one million HIV patients." Crispin,
supra note, 4. He has also stated that the letter from USTR. Papovich was merely "diplomatic."
Bhatiasevi & Maneerungsee, supra note 5.
174 See generally Pothisiri et al., supra note 25.
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sanctions. The United States should declare that it would not impose trade
sanctions if Thailand were to make generic copies of AIDS drugs because
Thailand is suffering from an AIDS emergency. This policy would allow
Thailand to reduce the cost of AIDS drugs and thus make them available to a
larger proportion of HIV-infected Thais. The markets for AIDS drugs in the
developed world, and thus the incentives of drug companies to develop
AIDS drugs, could be preserved by the enforcement of existing laws in the
United States and Western Europe that prohibit parallel importing.
A. Why Hasn't Thailand Made Generic Copies of AIDS Drugs?
Even though Thailand could legally produce generic copies of AIDS
drugs and probably has the technical capacity to do so, it has not made
generic copies of the drugs necessary for triple drug therapy. Arguably,
Thailand could legally issue compulsory licenses for these drugs under both
its 1999 Patent Act and TRIPs. 175  Only a small percentage of the HIV-
infected Thai citizens are receiving any sort of antiretrovira1 76 drug therapy,
and an even smaller percentage is receiving the triple drug therapy. 77 There
is a public demand for more affordable AIDS drugs. 178  Thailand has
demonstrated its ability to make generic copies of some drugs used in AIDS
treatment. 179  Under compulsory licenses, Thailand produced generic
versions of two AIDS drugs, zidovudine and fluconazole, drastically
reducing their prices. 180  In the three years after generic production began,
the price of zidovudine 181 fell from $324 to $87 per month. 182 The price of
fluconazole' 83 fell from $14 to just over $1 per daily dose. 184 Given these
175 See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
176 An antiretroviral drug treats the underlying disease by inhibiting the reproduction of HIV, whereas
other AIDS drugs treat only the symptoms of HIV-infection.
117 A study of 2,000 HIV-infected patients at Bamrasnaradul Hospital in northern Thailand indicated
that five percent were receiving some antiretroviral therapy while another one percent were receiving triple
drug therapy. Sakboon, supra note 4. See also Crispin, supra note 4; Thailand Battles, supra note 172.
178 Assavanonda, supra note 26; Group Seeks Legislation, supra note 26; Ching, supra note 26;
Groups Seek Cheaper Drugs, supra note 26; Crispin, supra note 4.
9 Boseley, supra note 30.
is0 Id.
181 Zidovudine is another chemical name for the nucleoside analog-type antiretroviral,
azidothymidine, also known as AZT, and sold under the brand name of Retrovir. J. Am. Med. Ass'n,
HIV/AIDS Information Center, Treatment Center, HIV/AIDS Drug Information (visited Sept. 30, 1999)
<http://www.ama-assn.org/special/hiv/treatment/druginfio/druginfo.htm> [hereinafter Journal of the
American Medical Association].
182 Boseley, supra note 30.
'8' Fluconazole is the chemical name for an antifungal drug sold under the brand name Diflucan.
Journal of the American Medical Association, supra note 181.
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examples, it seems certain that the production of generic copies of the drugs
necessary for triple drug therapy would reduce their price substantially,'
85
thus making these drugs available to more HIV-infected Thais. Given the
need and the demand,186 it is hard to understand why Thailand has not done
this.
Economic considerations probably play a role. Thai officials have
expressed reluctance to issue compulsory licenses for needed drugs because
they fear U.S. trade sanctions. 87  Recently, in the case of didanosine
("ddl"),'88 the Ministry of Health made an agreement with Bristol Myers
Squibb ("BMS"), the supplier of ddl in Thailand, under which BMS agreed
to reduce the price of ddl by more than half. 89 This suggests that, at least
for the moment, the Thai government prefers this route to issuing a
compulsory license for ddl.'9 It is difficult to obtain information on
production costs of AIDS drugs.' 91 This cost may be much lower than the
selling price, 192 although a substantial proportion of the selling price could
be due to unavoidable production costs. 19 If production costs constituted
only one-tenth of the current price of triple dru therapy, many Thais would
probably still be unable to afford these drugs.' However, such a reduction
in cost would certainly make triple drug therapy available to more Thais
's See id. Such an embarrassingly large price difference between a patented drug and a generic copy
has been cited as being reason enough for drug companies to oppose compulsory licensing and support
patent protection worldwide. Such differences essentially put the world on notice of the proportion of the
price of a patented drug that is profit See Love, supra note 30.
'5 If this were not true, it would be hard to understand the strenuous objections of the United States
to the South African Medicines Act of 1997, which allows the production of generic copies of AIDS drugs.
See, e.g., Cunqueiro, supra note 102; Love, supra note 30.
1 6 Recently, the demand for didanosine ("ddl"), a nucleoside analog type antiretroviral drug that is
one of the components triple drug therapy, has fueled a hot debate in Thailand. Thailand Battles, supra
note 172.
187 Crispin, supra note 4; Bhatiasevi & Maneerungsee, supra note 5.
8 Didanosine is a nucleoside analogue type antiretroviral drug. Journal of the American Medical
Association, supra note 181.
:89 Groups Seek Cheaper Drugs, supra note 26.
90 Ching, supra note 26.
191 Glaxo Wellcome has refused to disclose the cost of manufacturing AZT, a nucleoside analogue-
type antiretroviral AIDS drug, because it is "competitive information." Smith, supra note 65.
192 Another Appeal, supra note 5.93 A variety of drug companies produce protease inhibitors. See generally Journal of the American
Medical Association, supra note 181. Therefore, the pricing may be competitive.
19 One-tenth of the current price of triple drug therapy is $1,200 ($12,000 x 0.1). Drugs for AIDS
Victims, supra note 25. The average predicted per capita gross domestic product in Thailand in 1999 was
$2,258. Pothisiri et al., supra note 25. Only 18.5 million of the 60 million people in Thailand currently
have health insurance, which means that most people must directly pay for their health care. Charoen
Kittikanya, Blue Cross Looking to Provinces, BANGKOK POST, Dec. 15 1999, available in 1999 WL
28667545; Onnucha Hutasingh, HEALTH: Forum Bemoans Doctors Who Forsake Hippocratic Oath for
Lucre, BANGKOK POST, Jan. 2, 2000, available in 2000 WL 4679250. Half of the average per capita
domestic product is probably a price that few could afford.
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than currently have access to this therapy. But since producing these drugs
under compulsory licenses might result in economic sanctions from the
United States, the modest gains in the number of people able to afford triple
drug therapy might not justify the detrimental effects on the economy in the
eyes of the Thai government. Thus, the mere existence of Section 301195
may impose a higher level of protection for drug patents than is provided
under the Thai Patent Act or TRIPs. Although on two occasions the United
States announced its intention not to impose Section 301 sanctions in the
event that Thailand produces generic copies of AIDS drugs,'196 neither of
these assurances has been made directly to the Thai government. 97 Thai
officials remain unconvinced and wary of trade sanctions. 198 If the United
States communicated this assurance directly to the Thai government, it
would make it possible for Thailand to produce these drugs and make them
available to its citizens at lower prices without risking grave economic
consequences.
B. US. Policy Threatens Health Care in Thailand
Advancing the economic interests of the United States by promoting
strong worldwide patent protection for drugs restricts access to new AIDS
drugs in Thailand. It is in the best interests of the pharmaceutical industry,
as well as many other U.S. industries, to obtain worldwide protection of
intellectual property rights. 199 Political parties and individual officeholders
may also have more personal motives for serving the interests of the
pharmaceutical industry because drug companies are generous contributors
to both U.S. political parties. 200  However, patent protection drastically
increases the price of critical drugs in developing countries.20 1 In countries
such as Thailand, where most people do not have medical insurance,20 2 this
cost is paid directly by the consumer. Price increases can therefore cut off
access to drugs. Lack of access to lifesaving drugs is a serious threat to
health care in Thailand. Thus, U.S. efforts to promote its economic interests
195 See supra notes 133-139 and accompanying text.
:96 Ching, supra note 26.
197 See generally Crispin, supra note 4.
198 Id.
199 See Foster, supra note 47, at 297.
200 See id. at 298-99; see also Blood and Gore, supra note 38.
201 See generally Love, supra note 30.
202 Only 18.5 million of the 60 million people in Thailand currently have health insurance coverage.
Kittikanya, supra note 194; Hutasingh, supra note 194.
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threaten health care in Thailand, a basic human right20 3 that is presumably
safeguarded by international agreement.
204
C. Pharmaceutical Companies Focus Research on Diseases Endemic to
Developed Countries
Drug companies are unwilling to invest in research to develop drugs
for diseases that occur exclusively in developing countries; the disease must
be present in developed countries to make research and development
investments worthwhile. 20 5  Medical needs and prevalent diseases differ
profoundly between tropical and temperate areas in which developing and
developed countries, respectively, are located.20 6  Thus, drugs for
exclusively tropical diseases are not developed by drug companies.20 7 AIDS
affects people in both temperate and tropical zones. Hence, drug companies
have an economic incentive to invest in the development of AIDS drugs. 20 8
However, the vast majority of AIDS victims reside in Africa.209 Although
some drug companies have made generous charitable contributions to
countries affected by the AIDS epidemic,210 none have surrendered patent
protection for drugs they have spent millions developing.21'
203 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71, art. 25, § 1
(1948).
204 The tension between United States economic interests and health care availability in developing
countries was demonstrated when a bitter argument erupted on the floor of the World Health Assembly
between the United States and South Africa over the following seemingly innocuous words: "The Fifty-
second World Health Assembly . . . URGES Member States . . . to reaffirm their commitment to
developing, implementing and monitoring national drug policies and to taking all necessary concrete
measures in order to ensure equitable access to essential drugs." This language is from World Health
Assembly Res. WHA52.19 (1999). Ultimately, the United States reluctantly signed on to this agreement.
Love, supra note 30. The squabble reflects the current dispute between the United States and South Africa
on drug patents stemming from South Africa's insistence on its right to make generic copies of patented
drugs to treat its huge population of HIV-infected citizens. Id.
205 See Balms for the Poor, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1999, at 63.
206 Jeffrey Sachs, Helping the World's Poorest, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1999, at 17-18.
207 Malaria, for example, is largely confined to the tropics and kills between I and 2.5 million people
per year. Id. at 18. In spite of the potentially huge market, a vaccine for malaria does not yet exist. Id. at
18-19. This situation reflects the fear of drug companies that their efforts to develop such a vaccine would
not be remunerated because citizens of developing countries are unable to pay high prices for drugs. Id. at
19.
208 Since vaccines are usually low in cost and administered only a few times, there is far more
economic incentive for drug companies to produce expensive drugs for treating AIDS that must be taken
continuously than to produce vaccines to prevent the disease. Hence, public interest organizations have
sought to create incentives for drug companies to produce vaccines. See Balms for the Poor, supra note
205, at 63-64.
209 Sabin Russell, New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 24, 1999,
at Al.
2'0 For example, Bristol Myers Squibb has contributed 100 million dollars to help HIV-infected
women and children in sub-Saharan Africa. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, Bristol-Myers Squibb Commits
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The U.S. pharmaceutical companies that produce new drugs have
created the most successful pioneer drug industry in the world.212 These
companies have a clear interest in obtaining high levels of protection for
patented drugs worldwide.. However, most of the income from patented
drugs is generated from selling them at premium prices in places such as the
United States, Europe, and Japan, where people can afford to pay these
prices and where strong patent protection is available.2 13  Without the
financial incentive of a market in the developed world, drug companies
would be less willing to make the huge research investment necessary to
develop a drug.214 The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America estimated that drug companies spent over twenty-one billion dollars
on research in 1999.215 The cost of developing a single drug is
approximately $500 million,216 and only one out of 5,000 compounds
investigated ever reaches the market.217 In spite of these expenditures, the
U.S. pharmaceutical industry is hardly on tenuous financial ground but is, on
the contrary, an enormously profitable industry.218
Even though developing countries are unimportant markets to drug
219
companies, patent protection in these countries is still important to these
companies because of the possibility that inexpensive generic drugs made in
developing countries might be sold in developed countries.22  The drug
industry has been vociferous in its complaints of the inadequacy of patent
221protection offered by many countries. Some of these countries are
capable of producing generic versions of patented drugs,222 which can often
be sold at a fraction of the price charged by the patent holder in developed
$100 Million for HIV/AIDS Research and Community Outreach in Five African Countries (visited Dec. 3,
1999) <http://www.securethefuture.com/mediax/data/releas.htm>.
211 In contrast, Jonas Salk, who developed the polio vaccine, never patented it but instead gave it to
the public without remuneration. MACHLUP, supra note 28, at 55.
212 Foster, supra note 47, at 297.
213 Balms for the Poor, supra note 205, at 63-64.
214 McCabe, supra note 29, at 48-49.
215 Roller, supra note 29, at CPI.
216 Id.
217 McCabe, supra note 29, at 48.
218 Bristol Myers Squibb, an American Pharmaceutical Company, had net earnings of over one billion
dollars during the first three months of 1999. Bristol-Meyers Squibb, Inc., Form 10-Q: Quarterly Report
Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, available in Securities and Exchange
Commission Homepage (Mar. 31, 1999) <www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/14272/0000014272-99-
000004.txt>.
219 Sachs, supra note 206, at 18-19.
220 See Cunqueiro, supra note 102.
221 Letter to Ms. Harrison, supra note 47.
222 See, e.g., Foster, supra note 47, at 306-07.
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22countries. 23 In India, for example, the pirate drug industry earns $900
22
million per year from domestic sales alone. 24 If Indian generic drugs were
to be resold in Spain or Portugal,225 holders of drug patents could suffer
substantial losses throughout the European Union. Thus, from the
perspective of the drug companies, it would clearly be preferable if no
country in the world were producing generic versions of patented drugs.
The primary concern of the drug companies in taking this position appears to
be the protection of markets in the developed world from parallel importing.
D. U.S. Law Forbids Parallel Importing
U.S. case law has affirmed patent territoriality. Patent territoriality
can be explained as two rules: (1) the sale within the United States of a
product protected by a U.S. patent exhausts the patentee's rights; and (2) the
sale of a such a product outside the United States does not exhaust the
patentee's rights, and the patentee still has the right to prevent the resale of
this product within the United States.226 This doctrine was first enunciated
in the Supreme Court's ruling in Boesch v. Graff in 1890.227 The few cases
that have since addressed this issue have affirmed this view.228
E. The United States Should Allow Thailand to Make Generic Copies of
AIDS Drugs
Ideally, it would be desirable to preserve the incentives for drug
companies to develop new drugs without denying people in developing
countries access to these drugs at affordable prices. Present policies have
met the former goal but not the latter. If Thailand can produce generic
copies of the drugs necessary for triple drug therapy, the United States
should decline to bring any sanctions under Section 301229 and allow
Thailand to produce these drugs. Since U.S. law forbids parallel importing,
enforcement of existing law could preserve the valuable U.S. market for
AIDS drugs while allowing Thailand to obtain these drugs at the lowest
possible prices.
223 Boseley, supra note 30.
224 Foster, supra note 47, at 306-07.
225 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
226 See Wegner, supra note 53, at 3.
227 Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 702-03 (1890).
228 See, e.g., In re North Pigment Co., 71 F.2d 447 (C.C.P.A. 1934); see also Griffin v. Keystone
Mushroom Farm, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Penn. 1978).
229 See supra notes 133-145 and accompanying text.
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The problems with enforcing laws prohibiting parallel importing are
significant, though perhaps not insuperable. Under U.S. law, a patentee
must sue an infringer, in this case an illegal importer, to obtain relief.230
With their huge financial resources, 23' drug companies are well situated to
do this, and U.S. law in this area favors patentees in such suits. 232
Thailand's cooperation in such international lawsuits would make this a
feasible mechanism for enforcing the law against large-scale importers.
However, even drug companies cannot sue every individual who goes to
Thailand to buy less-expensive AIDS drugs and attempts to bring the drugs
into the United States in a suitcase. However, since eighty-five percent of
HIV patients in the United States and Western Europe are already receiving
triple drug therapy,233 this may not be a significant problem.
Compulsory licensing of AIDS drugs in Thailand would preserve the
incentives for the drug companies to produce AIDS drugs and would give
Thailand an opportunity to make triple drug therapy available to more of its
citizens. The United States has the largest number of HIV-infected citizens
of any developed country.234 Western Europe has the bulk of the remaining
HIV-infected people in the developed world.235  The United States and
Western Europe therefore constitute the major markets for AIDS drugs.
Without the incentives of these markets, it is unlikely that AIDS drugs
would have been developed or that new and better AIDS drugs will be
developed in the future. If these markets can be protected, then most of the
incentive for drug companies to continue research and development of new
AIDS drugs would be preserved. Since both the United States and the
European Union already forbid parallel importing,236 this solution requires
only that existing law be enforced. Thus, if the United States declined to
bring sanctions against Thailand for manufacturing generic versions of
AIDS drugs, the incentives of the drug companies to develop new AIDS
drugs, as well as the intellectual property rights of these companies, could
still be largely preserved. Although this solution would probably not make
230 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 281-82.
231 See, e.g., supra note 218.
232 See generally Wegner, supra note 53, at 4-i.
233 Crispin, supra note 4.
234 As of the end of 1997, the estimated numbers of HIV-infected people in various developed
countries were as follows: Western Europe, 480,000; Japan, 6,800; Australia and New Zealand, 12,000;
Canada, 44,000; and the U.S., 820,000. UNAIDS, Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic-June 1998
tbl. I (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.unadis.org/hivaidsinfo/statistics/june98/globalreport/data/
tab .xls>.
235 Id.
236 See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
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triple drug therapy available to all HIV-infected Thai,237 it would certainly
reduce the price of this therapy and make it available to a wider sector of the
Thai population.238 This would fulfill a critical need in Thailand and would
be a substantial benefit for the minor costs to the United States of declining
to impose trade sanctions and enforcing existing law.
V. CONCLUSION
International standards for the legal protection of drugs should focus
on protecting the ability of drug makers to sell their patented drugs at
premium prices in developed countries, rather than on preventing developing
countries from making affordable generic copies of patented drugs in
national emergencies. The high prices charged for patented drugs are
intended to support the research efforts of drug companies to find treatments
for diseases affecting people in developed countries, who can afford these
prices. Thus, it is fair that these people should pay for this research. The
Thai people, however, cannot afford the high cost of promising new AIDS
therapies. It does not follow that they should be denied the benefit of these
drugs in order to eliminate any possibility that the markets in developed
countries might be threatened. A better legal solution would focus on
enforcing existing law that forbids parallel importing in developed countries.
Thailand should be given the opportunity to provide drugs for its HIV-
infected citizens at the lowest possible prices without suffering U.S. trade
sanctions.
237 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
23. See Bosley, supra note 30.
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